两党立法选举中的策略性投票
Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections
American Economic Review · 2025 · [{"name": "Niall Hughes", "affiliation": ["King's College - North Carolina", "King's College London", "King's College School"]}]
中文摘要
我研究了包含两个政党和两个二元政策维度的多选区立法选举。策略性选民聚焦于其所在选区在立法机构中最有可能起决定性作用的维度。预见到这一点, 候选人所选择的政策不同于其在单选区选举中的选择。最终政策 (i) 由选民偏好唯一确定, (ii) 在每个维度上均为多数选区所偏好, 且 (iii) 若孔多塞赢家存在, 则为该孔多塞赢家。这些性质在单选区选举中并不能得到保证。(JEL D71, D72, D81, D91)
Abstract
I study multidistrict legislative elections with two parties and two binary dimensions of policy. Strategic voters focus on the dimension where their district is most likely to be pivotal in the legislature. Anticipating this, candidates select different policies than they would in single-district elections. The final policy is (i) uniquely pinned down by voter preferences, (ii) preferred by a majority of districts on each dimension, and (iii) a Condorcet winner if one exists. These properties are not guaranteed in single-district elections. (JEL D71, D72, D81, D91)