零和思维的政治经济学
The Political Economy of Zero‐Sum Thinking
Econometrica · 2025 · [{"name": "S. Nageeb Ali", "affiliation": ["Pennsylvania State University"]}, {"name": "Maximilian Mihm", "affiliation": ["New York University"]}, {"name": "Lucas Siga", "affiliation": ["University of Essex"]}]
中文摘要
本文为选举中的零和思维提供了一种策略性理由。我们表明，非对称信息与分配考量共同使选民对他人支持的政策保持警惕。这一力量推动多数选民支持与其偏好和信息相悖的政策。我们的分析识别并阐释了一种“逆向相关性”，它是零和思维在均衡中占据主导地位的充分必要条件。
Abstract
This paper offers a strategic rationale for zero‐sum thinking in elections. We show that asymmetric information and distributional considerations together make voters wary of policies supported by others. This force impels a majority of voters to support policies contrary to their preferences and information. Our analysis identifies and interprets a form of “adverse correlation” that is necessary and sufficient for zero‐sum thinking to prevail in equilibrium.