No Gifts Returned: Surprise Bonuses Reduce Productivity in a Natural Field Experiment
中文摘要
礼物交换假说认为,工人会以更高的生产率回报高于市场水平的工资。本文在一项自然田野实验中检验这一假说,实验中一对工人中的一人或两人在初始一轮数据录入任务后获得一笔自主决定的奖金。奖金的分配基于以下三项标准之一:(i)初始轮次中的相对生产率,(ii)经济需要,或(iii)任意决定。两人均未获得奖金或两人均获得奖金的两种情形作为基线。与礼物交换假说相反,我们发现奖金发放后的生产率显著下降,尤其是在两名工人都获得奖金时。这一结果表明,工人将奖金解读为雇主满意的信号,从而使他们得以降低努力。我们推测,奖金后生产率的下降可能源于以下原因之一:(a)对因懈怠而受到惩罚(如提前解雇)的感知风险降低,或(b)回报雇主善意的义务感减弱。一项后续实验复制了主要结果,为基于对解雇的恐惧减弱这一解释提供了中等程度的证据。奖金对生产率的主要效应相当大,相对于基线,第一次实验中努力下降15.1%,后续实验中下降8.4%。在只有一名工人获得奖金的情形下,在经济需要处理中,未获得奖金者的不平等厌恶似乎显著降低了生产率,而在生产率处理中,获得奖金者的地位寻求行为略微提高了生产率。本文由行为经济学与决策分析领域编辑Dorothea Kübler接收。资助:F. Bogliacino感谢Konrad Lorenz大学基金会[内部资助7INV1141]、Open Evidence[研究资助009]和国立大学[内部资助26007]提供的资助。G. Grimalda和D. Pipke感谢基尔世界经济研究所为后续实验提供的资助。补充材料:在线附录和数据文件可在 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.04085 获取。
Abstract
The gift exchange hypothesis posits that workers reciprocate above-market wages with increased productivity. This paper tests this hypothesis in a natural field experiment where one or both workers in a pair received a discretionary bonus after an initial round of data entry tasks. Bonuses were assigned based on one of three criteria: (i) relative productivity in the initial round, (ii) economic need, or (iii) an arbitrary decision. Two conditions where neither or both workers received a bonus served as the baseline. Contrary to the gift exchange hypothesis, we found a significant decline in postbonus productivity, especially when both workers received the bonus. This result suggests that workers interpreted the bonus as a signal of employer contentment, allowing them to reduce their effort. We conjectured that the postbonus productivity decline may result from either (a) a lower perceived risk of repercussions from slacking, such as early dismissal, or (b) a reduced sense of obligation to reciprocate the employer’s kindness. A follow-up experiment replicated the primary result, providing moderate evidence for the explanation based on reduced fear of dismissal. The main effect of bonuses on productivity was substantial, with effort reductions of 15.1% in the first experiment and 8.4% in the follow-up relative to baseline. In cases where only one worker received a bonus, nonrecipients’ inequality aversion appeared to decrease productivity markedly in the economic need treatment, whereas status-seeking behavior slightly increased productivity by bonus recipients in the productivity treatment. This paper was accepted by Dorothea Kübler, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: F. Bogliacino acknowledges funding from the Fundación Universitaria Konrad Lorenz [Internal Grant 7INV1141], Open Evidence [Research Grant 009], and the Universidad Nacional [Internal Grant 26007]. G. Grimalda and D. Pipke gratefully acknowledge funding for the follow-up experiment from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.04085 .