Management Science · 2026 · Petter Bjerksund、Trond Døskeland、André Wattø Sjuve、Andreas Ørpetveit
中文摘要
被称为“隐性指数基金”(closet indexers)的共同基金以主动型基金的形象进行营销,但实际上却作为低主动性基金运作。投资者最终为全套服务付费,却只获得其中的一部分。世界各地的监管机构正在考虑监管这些基金的办法。在此背景下,我们考察了斯堪的纳维亚监管机构监管干预的影响。我们将受到审查的斯堪的纳维亚基金与类似但未受影响的欧洲基金进行比较。研究结果表明,受到监管的斯堪的纳维亚基金倾向于选择提高主动性而非降低费用。因此,基金经理采取了更为主动的管理策略,导致年度 alpha 显著下降 2%。由此可见,这些监管干预给投资者带来了不利的结果。本文由金融方向编辑 Bo Becker 接收。资助:本研究得到挪威经济学院(NHH)Varekrigsfond for forsikringsaktiviteter 基金的资助。补充材料:在线附录和数据文件可在 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03124 获取。
Abstract
Mutual funds known as closet indexers are marketed as active but actually operate as low-activity funds. Investors end up paying for full service but receiving only a part of it. Supervisory authorities around the world are considering ways to regulate these funds. In this context, we examine the impact of regulatory interventions by Scandinavian regulators. We compare the scrutinized Scandinavian funds with similar unaffected European funds. The findings suggest that the regulated Scandinavian funds preferred increased activity over fee reduction. Consequently, fund managers adopted more active management strategies, resulting in a significant 2% decrease in annual alpha. Therefore, the regulatory interventions resulted in unfavorable outcomes for investors. This paper was accepted by Bo Becker, finance. Funding: This research was supported by funding from the Varekrigsfond for forsikringsaktiviteter at NHH. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03124 .