中文摘要
金融市场监管者长期以来一直在争论强制性公司财务披露的适当频率。高频披露可能有助于抑制过度投资,但也可能助长短期主义。本文报告了一项实验,考察不同报告频率对管理层投资决策的影响。实验结果表明,高频报告会在一定程度上诱发短期主义,但未能减少低频报告制度下观察到的过度投资。对意向投资计划进行无约束力的沟通确实能减少过度投资,但仅在低频报告制度下如此。本文由会计领域编辑 Ranjani Krishnan 接收。基金资助:本研究得到美国国家科学基金会 [资助号 SES 1949112] 的支持。补充材料:在线附录和数据文件可从 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01955 获取。
Abstract
Financial market regulators have long debated the appropriate frequency of mandatory corporate financial disclosures. Whereas frequent disclosures may help deter overinvestment, they may also encourage short-termism. This paper reports an experiment that examines the effects of varying reporting frequencies on managerial investment decisions. Experimental results indicate that frequent reporting modestly induces short-termism, but it fails to reduce the overinvestment observed in the infrequent reporting regime. Nonbinding communication of intended investment plans does reduce overinvestment, but only in the infrequent reporting regime. This paper was accepted by Ranjani Krishnan, accounting. Funding: This work was supported by the National Science Foundation [Grant SES 1949112]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01955 .