Management Science · 2026 · Vaarun Vijairaghavan、Hooman Hidaji、Barrie R. Nault
中文摘要
许多司法辖区已实施数据可携带性监管 (DPR), 要求数据控制者 (DC) 使用户能够下载其个人数据, 以便将数据转移至相互竞争的数据控制者。DPR 的意图在于将部分数据控制权归还用户、改善用户对数据控制者的选择、提高数据控制者的市场参与度, 并降低行业集中度。为实现这一目标, 若非货币性纠正措施 (例如警告、责令合规) 未能促成可携带性合规, DPR 允许政策制定者对不合规的数据控制者处以固定罚款或基于收入的可变罚款。此外, 政策制定者还可进行投资以降低数据控制者的合规成本。我们将这一互动建模为两阶段博弈: 第一阶段, 政策制定者设定罚款并进行投资; 第二阶段, 数据控制者决定是否参与市场, 若参与, 再决定是否遵守 DPR。与当前的监管目标相反, 我们发现在部分合规情形下, 罚款与投资均会降低数据控制者的参与度并加剧行业集中度。在比较运用罚款与投资以达到预定合规水平时, 与可变罚款或投资相比, 固定罚款对集中度 (参与度) 的附带效应更小 (更大)。一旦所有参与的数据控制者均合规——即完全合规——追加投资便会提高参与度。此外, 只有在存在由 DPR 引致的需求扩张 (例如源自多归属) 时, 才可能出现完全合规与完全参与, 而投资是实现这一结果的唯一政策工具。本文由 Hemant Bhargava (信息系统) 接受。资助: 本研究得到加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会 [资助号 RGPIN/06571-2015] 与加拿大社会科学与人文研究理事会 [资助号 435-2022-0460] 的支持。补充材料: 在线附录可从 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.08404 获取。
Abstract
Many jurisdictions have implemented data portability regulation (DPR) that requires that Data Controllers (DCs) enable users to download their personal data so that they can port their data to competing DCs. The intention of DPR is to return partial control of data to users, improve user choice of DCs, increase DC participation in the market, and reduce industry concentration. To achieve this, if nonmonetary corrective measures (e.g., warnings, orders to comply) to obtain portability compliance fail, then DPR allows policy-makers to impose fixed or variable (based on revenue) fines on DCs that do not comply. Additionally, policy-makers may invest to decrease compliance costs for DCs. We model this interaction as a two-stage game where in the first stage the policy-maker sets fines and makes investments. In the second stage DCs decide whether to participate in the market, and if so whether to comply with DPR. Contrary to the current regulatory objectives, we find that with partial compliance both fines and investments decrease DC participation and increase industry concentration. Comparing the use of fines and investment to achieve a predetermined level of compliance, the use of fixed fines has a smaller (larger) collateral effect on concentration (participation) than either variable fines or investment. Once all DCs that participate comply—full compliance—then additional investment increases participation. Moreover, full compliance and full participation can occur only if there is a DPR-induced demand expansion, such as from multihoming, and investment is the only instrument that can attain this outcome. This paper was accepted by Hemant Bhargava, information systems. Funding: This work was supported by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada [Grant RGPIN/06571-2015]; Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada [Grant 435-2022-0460]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.08404 .