中文摘要
本研究考察奖励制度在促进合作中的作用,尤其是在个人贡献不完全透明的情形下。我们利用一种被称为“带奖励的自愿贡献机制”(Voluntary Contribution Mechanism with Rewards)的实验设置,考察奖励机制对合作行为的影响。我们的实验设计将集中式奖励(CR)制度——由一个权威主体分配奖励——和分散式奖励(DR)制度——由同伴分配奖励——与无奖励基准进行比较。结果显示,CR通常促进最高水平的合作,而DR则在所有测试环境中实现最高的经济效率。参与者还表现出对CR的强烈偏好。这些发现凸显了奖励制度在信息不完全条件下缓解社会困境的有效性,从而对现有文献作出了贡献。本研究为政策制定者和组织成员选择能够促进持续集体行动的激励机制提供了重要洞见,即使个人努力无法被直接观察。本文由 Dorothea Kubler(行为经济学与决策分析)接受录用。致谢:感谢国家自然科学基金[项目号 72503075 与 72203132]、国家社会科学基金[项目号 20AZD044、22&ZD150 与 24&ZD084]、山东省自然科学基金[项目号 ZR2023QG096、ZR2023QG071、ZR2022MG068 与 ZR2022QG048]、山东省泰山学者工程[项目号 tsqn201909013 与 tsqn202408212]以及山东大学人文社会科学项目[项目号 21RWZD15]的资助。补充材料:在线附录与数据文件可在 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06479 获取。
Abstract
This research examines the role of reward systems in enhancing cooperation, particularly when individual contributions are not fully transparent. We investigate the impact of reward mechanisms on cooperative behavior using an experimental setup known as the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism with Rewards. Our experimental design compares centralized reward (CR) systems, where an authority distributes rewards, with decentralized reward (DR) systems, where peers allocate rewards, against a no-reward baseline. The results reveal that CR generally promotes the highest level of cooperation, whereas DR achieves the greatest economic efficiency across all test environments. Participants also exhibited a strong preference for CR. These findings contribute to the existing literature by highlighting the effectiveness of reward systems in mitigating social dilemmas under conditions of imperfect information. The study offers vital insights for policymakers and organizational members in selecting incentive mechanisms that foster sustained collective action, even when individual efforts are not directly observable. This paper was accepted by Dorothea Kubler, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: Financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72503075 and 72203132]; the National Social Science Foundation of China [Grants 20AZD044, 22&ZD150, and 24&ZD084]; the Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province [Grants ZR2023QG096, ZR2023QG071, ZR2022MG068, and ZR2022QG048]; the Taishan Scholar Program of Shandong Province [Grant tsqn201909013 and tsqn202408212]; and the Project of Humanities and Social Sciences of Shandong University [Grant 21RWZD15] is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06479 .