Government Deleveraging and the Reverse Crowding-In Effect: Evidence from Subnational Debt and Government Contractors
中文摘要
我们记录了一种新的商业信用渠道,政府去杠杆通过这一渠道影响私营经济。我们的实证分析利用了中国 2017 年的去杠杆行动——该行动削弱了地方政府的净融资能力——以及一个专门构建的、与政府采购合同相匹配的上市公司数据集。与非承包商企业相比,民营承包商的应收账款增幅更大,财务状况恶化更为严重,进而导致投资减少、经营业绩变差以及所有权变更概率升高。这些效应在国有企业中有所减弱,而国有企业表现出更低的生产率。因此,我们的发现揭示了一种反向挤入效应,即政府去杠杆会对民营企业造成不利影响并降低配置效率。本文由 Lin William Cong(金融)接受。补充材料:在线附录和数据文件可在 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.05679 获取。
Abstract
We document a novel trade-credit channel through which government deleveraging affects the private economy. Our empirical analysis exploits China’s 2017 deleveraging campaign that reduced local governments’ net financing capacity and a purpose-built data set of listed firms matched with government procurement contracts. Compared with noncontractors, private contractors experience larger increases in accounts receivable and deterioration in financial conditions, leading to fewer investments, worse operating performance, and higher probabilities of ownership changes. The effects are muted among state-owned enterprises, which demonstrate lower productivity. Our findings thus reveal a reverse crowding-in effect whereby government deleveraging adversely affects private firms and reduces allocative efficiency. This paper was accepted by Lin William Cong, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.05679 .