Management Science · 2026 · Ke Rong、D. Daniel Sokol、Di Zhou、Feng Zhu
中文摘要
许多司法辖区已启动反垄断执法,并对大型科技平台引入监管。中国《平台经济领域反垄断指南》(《平台指南》)迅速而严格的实施,为评估反垄断监管对平台竞争的影响提供了一个准自然实验。我们采用双重差分方法,实证考察中国《平台指南》对平台市场中投资数量与初创企业进入的影响。结果表明,《平台指南》并未提升这些受影响市场的创业活动;相反,这些市场的创业活动有所减弱,流入的风险投资减少,进入这些市场的初创企业也更少。我们的研究提示,政府应更审慎地考虑平台反垄断监管潜在的意外后果。本文由 D. J. Wu(信息系统)接收录用。补充材料:在线附录与数据文件可从 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04397 获取。
Abstract
Many jurisdictions have launched antitrust enforcement and brought in regulation of large tech platforms. The swift and strict implementation of China’s Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for the Platform Economy (Platform Guidelines) provides a quasi-natural experiment to evaluate the impact of antitrust regulation on platform competition. We adopt a difference-in-differences approach to empirically explore the impact of China’s Platform Guidelines on the number of investments and the entry of startups in platform markets. The results show that the Platform Guidelines did not increase entrepreneurship in these affected markets. Rather, entrepreneurship weakened in these markets, with less venture capital investment flowing into them and fewer startups entering these markets. Our study suggests that governments should consider more carefully the potential unintended consequences of antitrust platform regulation. This paper was accepted by D. J. Wu, information systems. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04397 .