Management Science · 2026 · Gérard P. Cachon、Tolga Dizdarer、Gerry Tsoukalas
中文摘要
平台设计中一个尚无定论的争论是,定价权应由谁控制:平台(集中式定价)还是其服务提供商(分散式定价)。我们表明,一个关键的权衡在于规范竞争与实现价格定制之间。集中式定价允许平台管理竞争,但平台面临信息不对称,因为其无法观察到代理人(agent)的成本。分散式定价让代理人能够根据自身成本调整价格,但在缺乏监督的情况下,竞争可能过强(价格过低)或过弱(价格过高)。对于基于佣金的平台,哪种价格控制形式占优取决于市场状况,这意味着两者并无绝对优劣。然而,一个相对简单的调整——采用基于公布价格或服务数量的仿射费用结构——使平台能够在不牺牲最优性的前提下将定价控制权分散化。这种灵活性进一步支持将代理人归类为独立承包商,为平台在如何构建其劳动力队伍方面提供了有价值的战略选项。本文由 Itai Ashlagi(收益管理与市场分析)接受发表。资助:Mack创新管理研究所与Ripple大学区块链研究计划提供了支持性资助。补充材料:在线附录及数据文件可从 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.04078 获取。
Abstract
An open debate in platform design is who should control pricing: the platform (centralized pricing) or its service providers (decentralized pricing). We show that a key trade-off is between regulating competition and enabling price tailoring. Centralized pricing allows the platform to manage competition, but it faces information asymmetry as it cannot observe agent costs. Decentralized pricing lets agents adjust prices to their costs, but without oversight, competition can become too strong (prices too low) or too weak (prices too high). For commission-based platforms, either form of price control can prevail depending on market conditions, implying that neither dominates. However, a relatively simple tweak—adopting an affine fee structure based on posted prices or quantities served—allows the platform to decentralize pricing control without sacrificing optimality. This flexibility further supports agent classification as independent contractors, offering platforms a valuable strategic option for how to structure their workforce. This paper was accepted by Itai Ashlagi, revenue management and market analytics. Funding: Supporting grants have been provided by the Mack Institute for Innovation Management and the Ripple University Blockchain Research Initiative. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.04078 .