自动化与两极化
Automation and Polarization
Journal of Political Economy · 2025 · [{"name": "Daron Acemoğlu", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Jonas Loebbing", "affiliation": []}]
中文摘要
我们构建了一个自动化任务分配模型。在复杂程度各异的连续任务中，每一项任务都被分配给资本或连续劳动技能中的某一项。我们刻画了内部自动化成立的条件，即由资本承担中等复杂度的任务。当低技能工资较低、且低复杂度任务中资本的有效成本较高时，就会出现内部自动化。最低工资会降低内部自动化发生的可能性。资本生产率的提高会导致就业与工资的两极分化，使技能溢价呈非单调变化，并降低那些比较优势特征与资本相近的劳动者的实际工资。
Abstract
We develop an assignment model of automation. Each of a continuum of tasks of variable complexity is assigned to either capital or one of a continuum of labor skills. We characterize conditions for interior automation, whereby tasks of intermediate complexity are performed by capital. Interior automation arises when low-skill wages are low and effective cost of capital in low-complexity tasks is high. Minimum wages make interior automation less likely. Higher capital productivity causes employment and wage polarization, changes the skill premium nonmonotonically, and reduces the real wage of workers with comparative advantage profiles close to that of capital.