夫妻的最优税收
The Optimal Taxation of Couples
Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2025 · [{"name": "Mikhail Golosov", "affiliation": ["University of Chicago"]}, {"name": "Ilia Krasikov", "affiliation": ["Arizona State University"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 我们研究单身家庭与已婚家庭的最优非线性税收问题。夫妻税负取决于配偶双方的收入，是多维税制的一个例子。我们发展了一套新颖的分析技术，用以研究此类税制的性质。我们证明，已婚个体的最优边际税率通常低于单身个体，因为夫妻间的资源共享提供了具有社会价值的再分配。在现实假设下，已婚个体的最优税率随配偶收入相关性的提高而上升；若配偶双方收入均较低（较高），一方的边际税率随另一方收入的上升而上升（下降）；主要收入者面临的边际税率低于次要收入者。
Abstract
ABSTRACT We study optimal nonlinear taxation of single and married households. Taxes on couples depend on the earnings of both spouses and are an example of multidimensional tax schedules. We develop novel analytical techniques to study properties of such taxes. We show that the optimal marginal taxes for married individuals are generally lower than for single individuals because resource sharing in couples provides socially valuable redistribution. Under realistic assumptions, the optimal tax rates for married individuals increase with the correlation of spousal earnings, the marginal tax rates for one spouse increase (decrease) in the earnings of the other if both spouses have low (high) earnings, and the primary earner faces lower marginal taxes than the secondary earner.