中文摘要
尽管监管层日益担忧可持续投资者可能被超额收费, 相关实证证据仍然缺乏。我们通过两项受控的"实地实验室"实验 (参与者为来自欧洲和美国的 415 名专业金融顾问) 以及一项含激励的调查, 识别出两种不同但相互作用的效应。首先, 金融顾问会向可持续投资者收取溢价。即使考虑技能、努力和成本方面的差异, 这一溢价依然存在。其次, 金融顾问会向金融素养较低的客户收取更高的费用。这两个因素相互作用。金融素养较低的可持续投资者被收取最高的费用, 而金融素养较高的可持续投资者则无需支付可持续性溢价。我们的发现表明, 金融顾问会就可持续投资委托收取额外费用, 但会避免向金融素养较高的可持续投资者多收费。本文由 Camelia Kuhnen (金融) 接收。资助: P. Smeets 得到荷兰科学研究组织 [资助号 VI.Vidi.221E.011] 的支持。实验获得马斯特里赫特大学商业与经济研究生院、阿姆斯特丹自由大学和拉德堡德大学的资金支持。补充材料: 在线附录和数据文件可在 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2025.00232 获取。
Abstract
Despite growing regulatory concerns about potential overcharging of sustainable investors, empirical evidence is lacking. In two controlled laboratory-in-the-field experiments with 415 professional financial advisors from Europe and the United States and an incentivized survey, we identify two distinct but interacting effects. First, advisors charge sustainable investors a premium. This premium persists even when accounting for differences in skill, effort, and costs. Second, advisors impose higher fees on clients with low financial literacy. These factors interact. Sustainable investors with low financial literacy are charged the highest fee, whereas those with high financial literacy do not pay a sustainability premium. Our findings suggest that advisors extract additional fees for sustainable investment mandates but avoid overcharging sustainable investors with high financial literacy. This paper was accepted by Camelia Kuhnen, finance. Funding: P. Smeets was supported by the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek [Grant VI.Vidi.221E.011]. The experiments were financially supported by the Graduate School of Business and Economics at Maastricht University, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and Radboud University. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2025.00232 .