Competing for Cookies: Platforms’ Business Models in Data Markets with Network Effects
中文摘要
我们研究平台竞争问题,其中平台可以:(1) 将用户数据商业化,并作为回报免费提供其服务(基于数据的商业模式);(2) 保护用户隐私并向用户收取参与费用(订阅模式);或 (3) 同时提供这两种选择(混合模式)。我们发现,竞争并不总会促使在位平台保护用户隐私。当网络效应处于中等水平时,竞争可能促使在位平台从订阅模式转向混合模式,从而增加数据商业化。然而,当网络效应较弱时,情况恰好相反。此外,允许在位平台采用混合模式,在网络效应较强时会增进福利,而在其他情况下则会降低福利(或福利中性)。本文由 Alfonso Gambardella(商业战略)接受发表。资助:本研究得到 Henry Crown 研究所、Eli Hurvitz 战略管理研究所、NET 研究所以及 Coller 基金会[资助号 0612017311]的支持。补充材料:在线附录可从 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07744 获取。
Abstract
We consider platform competition when platforms can (1) commercialize users’ data and in return offer their services for free (data-based business model); (2) protect users’ privacy and charge users for participation (subscription-based model); or (3) offer both options (the hybrid model). We find that competition does not always motivate the incumbent platform to protect users’ privacy. When network effects are intermediate, competition can motivate the incumbent to shift from the subscription-based model to the hybrid model, thereby increasing data commercialization. Yet, the opposite case occurs when network effects are weak. Moreover, allowing the incumbent to adopt the hybrid model is welfare enhancing when network effects are strong and welfare reducing (or neutral) otherwise. This paper was accepted by Alfonso Gambardella, business strategy. Funding: This work was supported by the Henry Crown Institute, the Eli Hurvitz Institute on Strategic Management, the NET Institute, and the Coller Foundation [Grant 0612017311]. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07744 .