中文摘要
餐饮外卖平台为餐厅创造线上需求并向顾客配送餐食。作为回报，餐厅向平台支付佣金，通常为订单金额的一定百分比。平台为合作餐厅提供一系列佣金费率选择，以更高的佣金支付换取特色展示位和配送费折扣，两者均能刺激需求。遗憾的是，当前环境严峻：平台急于覆盖配送成本，而餐厅则抱怨佣金过高。为理解当前实践，我们构建了一个包含一个平台和多家餐厅的博弈论模型。我们的建模结果凸显了两个现存问题。(1) 平台在其应用/网站上给予展示位的餐厅位置过远。由于这些餐厅并未将平台的配送成本内部化，它们愿意选择激进的高佣金以换取特色展示。(2) 平台收取的配送费过高，设定的配送边界过窄。这是因为平台承担了全部配送负担，却仅获得餐食收入的一小部分。为解决这些问题，我们对现有佣金合同提出一个简单的修正：除分享餐食收入外（目前已在做，但佣金费率较高），平台与餐厅还可以分摊配送成本与费用（目前未做）。我们证明，我们的方法实现了第一最优，即最大化了平台与餐厅共享的总蛋糕。利用一个代表性城市的数据，我们通过数值分析表明，平均而言，我们的协调合同将佣金费率降低33.3%，将配送费降低40.4%，使餐厅利润提高25.0%，使平台利润在30.9%的市场中提高，并使总利润提高13.3%。我们讨论了使我们的协调合同能够为各方带来共赢结果的市场特征。本文由运营管理领域的Karan Girotra接收。补充材料：在线附录和数据文件可在 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00435 获取。
Abstract
Food ordering and delivery platforms generate online demand for restaurants and deliver food to customers. In return, restaurants pay platforms a commission, typically a percentage of the order amount. Platforms offer partner restaurants the choice of a range of commission rates, rewarding higher commission payments with featured display slots and discounted delivery fees, both of which stimulate demand. Unfortunately, the current environment is grim: Platforms scurry to cover delivery costs, whereas restaurants gripe about excessive commissions. To understand current practice, we develop a game-theoretic model with a platform and multiple restaurants. Our modeling results highlight two existing problems. (1) Platforms, on their apps/websites, feature restaurants that are located too far away. Because these restaurants do not internalize the platform’s delivery costs, they are willing to choose aggressively high commissions to earn featured display. (2) Platforms charge delivery fees that are too high and set delivery boundaries that are too narrow. This is because they bear the entire burden of delivery but earn only a fraction of food revenues. To solve these problems, we propose a simple fix to existing commission contracts: beyond sharing food revenue (currently done but at high commission rates), platforms and restaurants can also split delivery costs and fees (currently not done). We show that our method attains first-best, that is, maximizes the total pie shared by platforms and restaurants. Using data on a representative city, we numerically show that, on average, our coordinating contract lowers commission rates by 33.3%, lowers delivery fees by 40.4%, increases restaurant profit by 25.0%, increases platform profit in 30.9% of the markets, and increases total profit by 13.3%. We discuss the characteristics of markets that enable our coordinating contract to yield a winning outcome for all parties. This paper was accepted by Karan Girotra, operations management. Supplemental Material: The online appendices and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00435 .