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相互依赖市场中数据共享的战略价值

The Strategic Value of Data Sharing in Interdependent Markets
Management Science · 2026 · Hemant Bhargava、Antoine Dubus、David Ronayne、Shiva Shekhar

中文摘要

大型综合型科技公司——即所谓“大型科技公司”(big-tech)——在其主要市场实力强大,并经常进入由专业公司构成的次级市场。人们自然会预期专业公司会严密保护其数据,以此维持其在次级市场中的市场地位。与这一直觉相反,我们证明专业公司愿意与侵入其市场的综合性公司共享其市场数据。为此,我们建立了一个跨市场竞争模型,在该模型中,通过消费者使用在一个市场收集的数据能够改进另一个市场的产品质量。我们表明,专业公司共享数据是为了在两家企业之间战略性地创造相互依存关系,从而缓和竞争,并将综合性公司从传统竞争对手转变为“竞合者”(coopetitor)。对作为侵入者的综合性公司而言,来自专业公司的数据替代了其在次级市场产品质量上的自有投资。如此一来,共享数据的行为使综合性公司成为专业公司所收集数据的利益相关者,进而也与其持续成功利害相关。此外,尽管企业从数据共享中获益,消费者却可能因价格竞争减弱和创新投资降低而境况变差。我们的结果具有管理与政策含义,尤其是在针对数据收集及大型科技公司市场势力的强烈反弹背景下。本文由 David Simchi-Levi 接收(信息系统方向)。基金:D. Ronayne 感谢德国研究联合会(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft)的支持 [CRC TRR 190;项目号 280092119]。补充材料:在线附录可在 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04938 获取。

Abstract

Large, generalist, technology firms—so-called “big-tech” firms—powerful in their primary market, routinely enter secondary markets consisting of specialist firms. Naturally, one might expect a specialist firm to be fiercely protective of its data as a way to maintain its market position in the secondary market. Counter to this intuition, we demonstrate that a specialist firm willingly shares its market data with an intruding generalist. We do so by developing a model of cross-market competition in which the data collected via consumer usage in one market can improve product quality in another. We show that a specialist firm shares its data to strategically create codependence between the two firms, thereby softening competition and transforming the generalist firm from a traditional competitor into a coopetitor. For the generalist intruder, data from the specialist firm substitute for its own investments in product quality in the secondary market. As such, the act of sharing data makes the generalist a stakeholder in the data collected by the specialist, and consequently in the specialist’s continued success. Moreover, although the firms benefit from data sharing, consumers can be worse off from weakened price competition and lower investments in innovation. Our results have managerial and policy implications, notably on account of backlash against data collection and the market power of big-tech firms. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, information systems. Funding: D. Ronayne is grateful for support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [CRC TRR 190; Project 280092119]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04938 .
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