Competition Avoidance vs. Herding in Job Search: Evidence from Large-Scale Field Experiments on an Online Job Board
Management Science · 2026 · Andrey Fradkin、Monica Bhole、John J. Horton
中文摘要
关于某一职位空缺申请人数的信息可能同时传递竞争程度与空缺质量的信号。我们研究这类信息如何影响求职。为此，我们在一个大型在线招聘平台上开展了三项实验，其中处理改变了向求职者展示的信息。关于职位空缺先前申请人数的信息增加了申请数量，并将申请引导至先前申请较少的空缺职位。关于空缺职位发布时长的信息提高了申请率，尤其是对新发布空缺职位的申请率。为进一步探究因果机制，我们开展并分析了一项调查选择实验。我们得出结论:求职者更倾向于规避竞争，而非将职位的受欢迎程度用作质量信号。本文由 Karan Girotra 接收(运营管理方向)。基金:本研究得益于 A. Fradkin、J. J. Horton 与 Meta 之间的一项研究咨询协议。作为该协议的一部分，A. Fradkin 与 J. J. Horton 以承包人员身份受聘。补充材料:在线附录和数据文件可在 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.02483 获取。
Abstract
Information about the number of applicants to a job vacancy might simultaneously signal the degree of competition and vacancy quality. We study how this information affects job search. To do so, we conduct three experiments on a large online job platform in which the treatment varies what information is shown to job seekers. Information about the number of prior applicants to a vacancy increases the number of applications and redirects them to vacancies with few prior applications. Information about vacancy age increases application rates, especially to new vacancies. To further investigate the causal mechanisms, we conduct and analyze a survey choice experiment. We conclude that job seekers prefer to avoid competition rather than use the popularity of a vacancy as a signal of quality. This paper was accepted by Karan Girotra, operations management. Funding: This research was facilitated through a research consulting agreement between A. Fradkin, J. J. Horton, and Meta. A. Fradkin and J. J Horton were employed as contractors as part of the agreement. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.02483 .