Punish One, Teach a Hundred: The Sobering Effect of Peer Punishment on the Unpunished
Management Science · 2026 · Francesco D’Acunto、Michael Weber、Jin Xie
中文摘要
直接经历同群企业受罚,可能产生超越威慑(即关于处罚的信息)之外的警醒效应。我们在中国检验这一机制,考察同处一地(同群)的企业与非同群企业、以及国企与非国企对上市国有企业(SOE)因欺诈性贷款担保而受处罚的反应。在国企受罚之后,即使信息与当地经济冲击对所有企业而言是共同的,同群国企削减贷款担保的幅度仍大于非同群国企和同群非国企。对于CEO职业顾虑更高和/或削减贷款担保成本更低的同群国企,这一反应更为强烈。本文由金融领域编辑 Bo Becker 录用。补充材料:在线附录及数据文件可在 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03309 获取。
Abstract
Direct experience of a peer’s punishment might have a sobering effect above and beyond deterrence (information about punishments). We test this mechanism in China, studying the reactions to listed state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) punishments for fraudulent loan guarantees by firms in the same location (peers) and nonpeer firms across SOEs and non-SOEs. After experiencing SOEs’ punishments, peer SOEs cut their loan guarantees by more than nonpeer SOEs and peer non-SOEs even if information and local economic shocks are common to all firms. The reaction is stronger for peer SOEs whose CEOs have higher career concerns and/or face lower costs of reducing loan guarantees. This paper was accepted by Bo Becker, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03309 .