中文摘要
绩效排名会激发工人的多种社会性激励。一方面,它提供地位奖励以诱使工人增加努力;另一方面,排名靠前的工人可能出于对社会报复的担忧而降低努力,以使自己的生产率与同事保持一致。本文利用一家毛衣工厂的田野实验来厘清绩效排名背后的激励。受处理的工人以私下或公开的方式获得排名。我发现,私下排名平均而言没有任何效应,而公开排名则降低了工人的生产率。其他证据证实,生产率下降源于工人的社会顾虑及其与朋友的生产率保持一致的意愿。工人之间的合作也有所减少,但对生产率的影响有限。本文说明,诱导工人竞争对企业而言可能适得其反。本文由 Marie Claire Villeval (行为经济学与决策分析) 接收录用。基金:感谢经济政策研究中心 "低收入国家私营企业发展" 项目 [PEDL ERG 4362] 以及德国研究基金会 (DFG) 通过 CRC TRR 190 [项目 280092119] 提供的经费支持。补充材料:在线附录和数据文件可在 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01381 获取。
Abstract
Performance ranking can trigger multiple social incentives for workers. On one hand, it offers status rewards to induce them to increase effort. On the other, better-ranked workers may reduce effort to conform to coworkers’ productivity in fear of social retribution. This paper uses a field experiment in a sweater factory to disentangle the incentives underlying performance ranks. Treated workers receive ranks either privately or publicly. I find that private ranks do not have any effect on average but that public ranks reduce worker productivity. Additional evidence confirms that productivity declines because of workers’ social concerns and their desire to conform to the productivity of their friends. Cooperation between workers decreases too but with limited effect on productivity. The paper illustrates how inducing worker competition may be counterproductive for firms. This paper was accepted by Marie Claire Villeval, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: Financial support from the Private Enterprise Development in Low-Income Countries, Centre for Economic Policy Research [PEDL ERG 4362] and the DFG through CRC TRR 190 [Project 280092119] are gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01381 .