How Does Health Insurance Affect Firm Employment and Performance? Evidence from Obamacare
中文摘要
本文讨论强制雇主提供具有最低质量的健康保险以及随之而来的健康保险保费上涨,如何影响企业雇佣与绩效。利用《患者保护与平价医疗法案》(PPACA) 通过前后的企业层面员工健康保险数据,我们发现 PPACA 与公司赞助健康保险计划中员工健康保险保费的显著上升相关。作为应对,受 PPACA 影响较大的雇主在法案颁布后更大幅度地减少员工在其健康保险计划中的参保。我们的分析表明,雇主是通过将雇佣构成从全职员工转向兼职、临时或季节性工人来实现参保人数的这一减少的,因为这些工人不在雇主赞助的健康保险计划的覆盖范围内。此外,我们没有发现受健康保险保费上涨影响较大的公司出现绩效恶化的证据。总体而言,本文的发现说明了企业如何通过策略性劳动用工实践来适应并缓解监管变化带来的成本上升。本文由 Lin William Cong (金融领域) 接收录用。补充材料:在线附录和数据文件可在 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03761 获取。
Abstract
This article discusses how mandating employers to provide health insurance of a minimum quality and the associated increases in health insurance premia affect firm employment and performance. Using firm-level employee health insurance data around the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), we show that the PPACA is associated with a significant increase in health insurance premia for employees in company-sponsored health insurance plans. In response, employers with greater exposure to the PPACA reduce employee enrollments in their health insurance plans to a larger extent after the law’s enactment. Our analysis suggests that employers achieve this reduction in enrollment by shifting employment composition from full-time employees to part-time, temporary, or seasonal workers, who are not covered in employer-sponsored health insurance plans. Furthermore, we find no evidence of deterioration in performance at companies more exposed to the increase in health insurance premia. Overall, our findings illustrate how firms adapt to and mitigate cost increases associated with regulatory changes through strategic labor practices. This paper was accepted by Lin William Cong, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03761 .