中文摘要
我们研究性别在企业债务再谈判中的作用。利用巴西的法庭内重整数据,我们发现男性主导的债权人更有可能否决由女性主导的债务人提出的方案。尽管我们无法确定性地识别驱动这一模式的深层机制,但与替代性解释相比,我们的发现与基于性别的歧视更为一致。这种行为可能代价高昂:女性主导的债务人在重整下实现的回收率高于清算下,这意味着否决可能造成无谓损失。我们的观察支持信念校准偏误的解释:当男性债权人此前接触过成功的女性主导企业时,基于性别的否决差距会缩小,这为缓解该问题指出了潜在路径。本文由 Bo Becker(金融)接收。补充材料:在线附录和数据文件可从 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.05802 获取。
Abstract
We study the role of gender in corporate debt renegotiation. Using in-court reorganizations from Brazil, we find that male-led creditors are more likely to reject plans put forward by female-led debtors. Although we cannot definitively identify the underlying mechanism driving this pattern, our findings align more consistently with gender-based discrimination compared with alternative explanations. This behavior may be costly: Female-led debtors deliver higher recoveries under reorganization than under liquidation, implying that rejections potentially create deadweight losses. Supporting a miscalibrated-beliefs explanation, we observe that the gender-based rejection gap narrows when male creditors have prior exposure to successful female-led businesses, pointing to a potential path for mitigation. This paper was accepted by Bo Becker, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.05802 .