Does Personalized Pricing Increase Competition? Evidence from NIL in College Football
中文摘要
本文考察大学体育中通过姓名、形象与肖像权（NIL）实现的个性化定价对大学项目招募高中橄榄球运动员的影响。我们关注这一新政策是否通过提高人才在排名靠前院校中的集中度而破坏竞争平衡。我们使用涵盖NIL实施前后招募模式的数据集，考察3星、4星和5星新兵在大学橄榄球项目中的分布，发现人才离散度明显上升。与NIL将导致“富者愈富”动态的假说相反，我们观察到NIL实施后排名较低的橄榄球项目有吸引更高质量新兵的倾向，这在5星和排名较低的4星运动员中尤为明显。此外，我们表明NIL实施后的3星新兵正在为NIL收入而牺牲教育，他们就读的大学选择性较低、SAT班级平均分较低，且其毕业生的职业生涯中期收入较低。我们同样没有发现证据表明在橄榄球上投入更多资金的学校在NIL实施后吸引了更好的人才。NIL实施后竞争力有所改善，即使在控制了人才、表现和转学门户之后，博彩公司设定的让分差也更小。最终，本研究对NIL对竞争平衡的短期效应进行了全面考察，并为对这一具有里程碑意义的政策变化的长期后果的持续研究奠定了基础。
Abstract
We investigate the impact of personalized pricing through Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL) rights within college athletics on the recruitment of high school football players by college programs. We focus on whether the new policy disrupts competitive balance by increasing the concentration of talent among top-ranked institutions. Using a data set that encompasses pre- and post-NIL recruitment patterns to examine the distribution of 3, 4, and 5* recruits at college football programs, we find a notable increase in the dispersion of talent. Contrary to the hypothesis that NIL would lead to a “rich get richer” dynamic, we observe a tendency for lower-ranked football programs to attract higher-quality recruits post-NIL, especially among 5- and lower ranked 4* athletes. Furthermore, we show that post-NIL 3* recruits are sacrificing schooling for NIL money and are attending colleges that are less selective and have lower SAT class averages and whose graduates earn a lower midcareer income. We also do not find evidence that schools that spend more money on football are attracting better talent post-NIL. Competitiveness improves post-NIL as sportsbooks set smaller point differentials even after controlling for talent, performance, and the transfer portal. Ultimately, this study offers a comprehensive examination of NIL’s short-term effects on competitive balance and sets the stage for ongoing research into the long-term consequences of this landmark policy change.