中文摘要
我们考察买方是否会因英国一项强制公开披露其付款惯例的监管变化而减少逾期付款。我们发现，受该监管约束的英国买方减少了其逾期付款。在横截面检验中，我们发现这种逾期付款的减少在以下情形中更为明显：逾期付款程度更高的买方、面临更集中供应商基础的买方，以及供应商相对于其他供应商对买方更为重要的买方—供应商关系。在进一步检验中，我们记录了与逾期付款披露后逾期付款方订约成本上升相一致的证据。具体而言，我们发现逾期付款的买方经历了(i)供应商流失和(ii)负面的股票市场反应。最后，对于受该监管约束的买方，我们记录了经营现金流下降、债务上升、投资下降以及未来盈利能力下降。我们关于逾期付款披露包含对决策有用信息的发现，可为准则制定者提供参考，因为 FASB 和 IASB 近期强制要求了与商业信用相关的新披露，却未强制要求与逾期付款相关的披露。
Abstract
We examine whether buyers reduce their late payments in response to a regulatory change in the United Kingdom that mandates the public disclosure of their payment practices. We find that UK buyers subject to this regulation reduce their late payments. In cross-sectional tests, we find that this reduction in late payments is more pronounced for buyers with a greater extent of late payments, buyers facing a more concentrated supplier base, and buyer-supplier relationships in which a supplier is more important to a buyer than other suppliers. In additional tests, we document evidence consistent with increases in contracting costs for late payers after the disclosure of late payments. Specifically, we find that late-paying buyers experience (i) a loss of suppliers and (ii) a negative stock market reaction. Finally, for buyers subject to the regulation, we document a decrease in operating cash flows, increase in debt, decrease in investment, and decrease in future profitability. Our findings that the disclosure of late payments contains decision-useful information can inform standard-setters, as the FASB and IASB recently mandated new disclosures related to trade credit but omitted mandates for disclosures related to late payments.