Financial Intermediaries and Agency Problems With and Without Vertical Incentives
中文摘要
我研究存在代理问题时,零售债券市场中上游发行人与下游经纪人之间纵向激励的作用。尽管公平交易(保持距离)规则要求纵向激励不得影响其活动,我表明上游发行人与下游经纪人均对纵向激励敏感。随后,我构建了一个结构模型,在控制代理问题程度的前提下,度量下游经纪人纵向激励的程度。结构估计显示,若其纵向一体化发行人的利润增加 1.25 美元,经纪人愿意放弃 1 美元的自身利润。本文由 Victoria Ivashina(金融)接收。补充材料:在线附录与数据文件可从 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03572 获取。
Abstract
I study the role of vertical incentives between upstream issuers and downstream brokers in the retail bond market when there exist agency problems. Although arms-length transaction regulations require that vertical incentives not influence their activities, I show that both upstream issuers and downstream brokers are sensitive to vertical incentives. I then present a structural model in order to measure the degree of vertical incentives for downstream brokers, controlling for the extent of agency problems. The structural estimates show that brokers are willing to give up one dollar of their own profit if their vertically integrated issuer’s profit goes up by 1.25 dollars. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivashina, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03572 .