合谋对抗环境规制
Colluding Against Environmental Regulation
Review of Economic Studies · 2025 · [{"name": "Jorge Alé‐Chilet", "affiliation": ["Universidad de Los Andes"]}, {"name": "Cuicui Chen", "affiliation": ["University at Albany, State University of New York"]}, {"name": "Jing Li", "affiliation": ["Tufts University"]}, {"name": "Mathias Reynaert", "affiliation": ["Université Toulouse-I-Capitole", "Toulouse School of Economics"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 本文研究企业针对监测不完全的环境监管所进行的合谋行为。企业通过违反监管增加可变利润, 并通过联合违规降低预期的违规处罚。我们考察了三家德国汽车制造商合谋降低排放控制技术有效性的一个案例。通过估计2007年至2018年欧洲汽车行业的结构模型, 我们发现合谋大幅降低了预期的违规处罚, 并增加了买方与生产者剩余。由于污染加剧, 福利减少了15.7亿至55.7亿欧元。我们展示了环境政策设计与反垄断在防止违规方面如何发挥互补作用。
Abstract
Abstract We study collusion among firms against imperfectly monitored environmental regulation. Firms increase variable profits by violating regulation and reduce expected noncompliance penalties by violating jointly. We consider a case of three German automakers colluding to reduce the effectiveness of emissions control technology. By estimating a structural model of the European automobile industry from 2007 to 2018, we find that collusion lowers expected noncompliance penalties substantially and increases buyer and producer surplus. Due to increased pollution, welfare decreases by € 1.57–5.57 billion. We show how environmental policy design and antitrust play complementary roles in preventing noncompliance.