非货币激励与官僚绩效：来自美国法院的证据

中文摘要

联邦法官享有终身任期和受宪法保护的薪酬，是检验以激励为基础的官僚体制改革的一个尤为困难的案例。我研究了“六个月清单”这一要求美国联邦法院公开列明存在逾期未决事项的法官的改革。运用断点回归设计及其他方法，我发现受影响最大的案件比受影响最小的案件结案速度快约14%，且这一效应在较年轻、非白人和女性法官中更大。这种速度提升伴随着权衡：前期节省的时间部分被后续环节的延迟所抵消，且受影响更大的案件更有可能在上诉中被推翻。一项堆积分析估计总体时间节省约为4%，表明非货币手段即使在高度受保护的精英专业人士中也能改变行为。

Abstract

Federal judges—who enjoy lifetime tenure and constitutionally protected salaries—represent an especially hard test case for incentive-based bureaucratic reform. I study the “six-month list,” a reform requiring U.S. federal courts to publicly identify judges with overdue matters. Using a regression discontinuity design and other methods, I find that matters most exposed are resolved approximately 14% faster than those least exposed, with larger effects among younger, non-white, and female judges. The speed gains come with trade-offs: upfront time savings are partially offset by downstream delays, and more-exposed matters are more likely to be reversed on appeal. A bunching analysis estimates aggregate time savings of approximately 4%, demonstrating that non-monetary levers can shift behavior even among highly insulated elite professionals.