Escaping temporary traps? Evidence from age-based incentives to permanent employment
中文摘要
本文研究缩小无固定期限合同与临时合同之间的成本差异如何影响企业对两类合同的使用。我们分析1997年西班牙的一项改革，该改革降低了针对30岁以下和45岁以上劳动者新签无固定期限（OE）合同的非工资劳动成本，而未影响短期（ST）合同。利用行业暴露程度与基于年龄的断点，我们发现，企业对年轻劳动者从ST合同大幅转向OE合同，但对年长劳动者的反应很小。我们发现补贴对直接受影响的无固定期限岗位存在部分工资归宿。ST合同与OE合同之间的隐含替代弹性在30岁以下劳动者中为6.5，在45岁以上劳动者中接近于零。我们还发现，年轻劳动者在未获补贴的ST岗位上的工资上升，这与OE就业的扩张增强了其外部选择相一致。总体而言，这些结果揭示了合同替代中显著的年龄不对称性。结果表明，货币激励能够促进年轻劳动者从临时就业向无固定期限就业的转换，但对45岁以上劳动者的效果较弱。
Abstract
This paper studies how reducing the cost differential between permanent and temporary contracts affects firms’ use of each contract type. We analyze a 1997 Spanish reform that lowered non-wage labor costs for new open-ended (OE) contracts for workers under 30 and over 45, while leaving short-term (ST) contracts unaffected. Exploiting sectoral exposure and age-based discontinuities, we show that firms substitute strongly from ST to OE contracts for young workers but respond little for older workers. We find partial wage incidence of the subsidy on directly affected permanent jobs. The implied elasticity of substitution between ST and OE contracts is 6.5 for workers below age 30 and close to zero for workers above age 45. We also document that young workers’ wages rise in unsubsidized ST jobs consistent with the expansion of OE employment strengthening their outside options. Overall, the results reveal sharp age asymmetries in contract substitution. They suggest that monetary incentives can facilitate transitions from temporary to permanent employment for young workers, but are less effective for workers above age 45.