分裂时代的不可逆投资:互补性与公共品供给

中文摘要

我们研究两个对公共品估值不同的政党轮流执政情形下的技术投资与公共品供给问题。在每一期,执政党选择公共品供给水平,并投资于能够降低未来公共品供给成本的技术。我们刻画了马尔可夫完美均衡,并说明极化程度与投资的不可逆性如何共同塑造长期结果。当极化程度较低时,政权更替可能提高预期技术投资与公共品供给,且稳态结果不受可逆性程度的影响。然而,当极化程度较高时,不可逆性变得重要:偏好公共品的政党投资更为积极,而不可逆投资会促使两党都提供更多的公共品。随着极化程度上升,预期技术存量与公共品供给起初下降,但一旦不可逆性约束开始起约束作用,二者便会向上跃升。

Abstract

We study technology investment and public good provision in a setting where two parties with differing valuations of the public good alternate in power. In each period, the incumbent chooses public good provision and invests in technology that lowers the cost of future public good provision. We characterize Markov perfect equilibria and show how polarization and irreversibility of investment jointly shape long-run outcomes. When polarization is low, power turnover may increase expected technology investment and public good provision, and steady-state outcomes are unaffected by the degree of reversibility. When polarization is high, however, irreversibility becomes important: the party favoring the public good invests more aggressively, and irreversible investment induces higher public good provision by both parties. As polarization rises, expected technology stock and public good provision initially decline but jump upward once the irreversibility constraint binds.