Journal of Public Economics · 2026 · Katie Bollman、Benjamin Hansen、Edward Rubin、Garrett Stanford
中文摘要
我们以俄勒冈州第114号法案的微弱通过为自然实验,研究新枪支法规如何影响枪支需求。作为需求代理变量的背景审查数量,在公投预期下上升了13.9%,并在选举结束后立即激增157%。司法干预使该法暂停实施后,需求回落至接近选举前的水平。时间性位移/收割效应无法解释这一需求激增:十八个月后,我们仍观察到涉枪背景审查累计超额增加63,000次。行政数据显示出显著的州内异质性。这一证据凸显了枪支管制政策的悖论效应,为政策制定者提供了警示。
Abstract
Using Measure 114’s narrow passage in Oregon as a natural experiment, we study how new gun regulations affect firearm demand. Background checks, a proxy for demand, rose 13.9% in anticipation of the referendum and surged 157% immediately following the election. After judicial intervention halted the law’s enactment, demand returned near pre-election levels. Temporal displacement/harvesting does not explain the demand spike: after eighteen months, we still observe a substantial cumulative increase of 63,000 excess firearm-related background checks. Administrative data reveal significant within-state heterogeneity. This evidence underscores the paradoxical effect of gun-control policies, offering a cautionary lesson to policymakers.