Rewarding success and failure: Moral hazard and adverse selection in strategic experimentation
Games and Economic Behavior · 2026 · Fahad Khalil、Jacques Lawarree、Alexander Rodivilov
中文摘要
委托人雇佣一名代理人来了解项目成本（实验），随后执行该项目（生产）。代理人对成本较低的概率拥有私人信息，且高类型代理人比低类型更为乐观。学习过程被建模为一系列实验，代理人在每次实验中私下选择其努力水平。由于逆向选择与道德风险同时存在，即便是低类型代理人也可能谎报类型、在实验过程中偷懒并赚取租金。在最优合同中，委托人利用实验的时长与结果以及支付时点的安排来激励努力并甄别代理人。委托人可能发现，在实验失败后奖励低类型代理人才是最优的。我们给出了成功与失败均应获得奖励的充分条件。我们证明过度实验可能是最优的，因为它减少了经历一系列失败实验后的信息不对称。我们还考虑了将实验与生产交由两个不同代理人分别承担是否可能是最优的。当同一代理人承担两项任务时，委托人可以利用逆向选择租金来缓解道德风险。因此，当逆向选择较为严重时，将实验与生产整合在一起是最优的。
Abstract
A principal hires an agent to learn about the cost of a project (experimentation) and then to execute it (production). The agent is privately informed about the probability that the cost is low, with the high-type agent more optimistic than the low type. Learning is modeled as a series of experiments, where the agent privately chooses his effort in each experiment. Due to the joint presence of adverse selection and moral hazard, even the low type can misrepresent his type, shirk during experimentation and earn a rent. In the optimal contract, the principal uses the length and outcome of experimentation as well as the timing of payments to induce effort and screen the agent. The principal may find it optimal to reward the low type after failure in experimentation. We provide sufficient conditions for both success and failure to be rewarded. We show that over-experimentation can be optimal as it reduces the asymmetric information after a series of failed experiments. We also consider whether it may be optimal to separate experimentation and production between two different agents. When the same agent works on both tasks, the principal can leverage the adverse selection rent to mitigate moral hazard. Therefore, integrating experimentation and production is optimal when adverse selection is severe.