中文摘要
本文考察在存在劳动负激励、且消费者/劳动者/投票者类型上存在信息不对称的情况下,围绕一般非线性所得税进行投票的政治经济学情境。各主体之间不进行沟通或协调。经济是某一连续分布一次有限抽取的实现。对该次抽取所要求的收入由该次抽取下公共品的帕累托最优提供决定。假设政府必须满足任何可能抽取下的收入要求,换言之,即税收是稳健的,则证明在稳健集内,多数规则均衡存在于中位投票者偏好的税收函数处。对效用的关键限制是可加可分性、拟线性,以及来自公共品的效用对类型具有乘性。
Abstract
The political economy setting of voting over general nonlinear income taxes with labor disincentives and information asymmetry in consumer/worker/voter types is considered. Agents do not communicate or coordinate with each other. The economy is the realization of a finite draw from a continuous distribution. The revenue required from a draw is determined by Pareto optimal provision of a public good for that draw. Assuming that the government must meet the revenue requirement for any possible draw, in other words the tax is robust, a majority rule equilibrium is shown to exist at the median voter’s preferred tax function out of this robust set. The key restrictions on utility are additive separability, quasi-linearity, and that utility from the public good is multiplicative in type.