From Immediate Acceptance to Deferred Acceptance: Effects on School Admissions and Achievement in England
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2026 · Camille Terrier、Parag A. Pathak、Kevin Ren
中文摘要
世界各国和各城市日益依赖集中化的学生分配系统。延迟录取（DA）与即时录取（IA）两种算法被广泛采用。我们考察英格兰在全国范围内禁止即时录取的效果。禁令实施前，49个地方当局采用延迟录取，16个采用即时录取；禁令实施后，所有地方当局均转为延迟录取。我们发现，取消即时录取使低社会经济地位学生的学校质量指标下降幅度大于高社会经济地位学生。这一效应主要由选择性学校中低社会经济地位学生录取人数减少所驱动。我们的发现揭示了从即时录取向延迟录取转变的一个非预期后果。（JEL D82, H52, H75, I21, I28）
Abstract
Countries and cities around the world increasingly rely on centralized systems for student placement. Two algorithms, deferred acceptance (DA) and immediate acceptance (IA), are widespread. We investigate the effects of the national ban of IA in England. Before the ban, 49 local authorities used DA and 16 used IA; all switched to DA afterward. We find that the elimination of IA reduces measures of school quality for low-SES students more than high-SES students. This effect is primarily driven by a decrease in low-SES admissions at selective schools. Our findings point to an unintended consequence of the IA to DA transition. (JEL D82, H52, H75, I21, I28)