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存款特许权挤兑

Deposit Franchise Runs
The Journal of Finance · 2026 · ITAMAR DRECHSLER、ALEXI SAVOV、PHILIPP SCHNABL、OLIVIER WANG

中文摘要

存款特许权之所以具有价值,是因为银行支付的存款利率低于市场水平。然而,一旦储户撤离,其价值便会消失。这可能引发未保险储户的挤兑,即使银行持有完全流动的资产。由于特许权价值随利率上升而增加,当利率较高时,挤兑的危害更大,因而也更有可能发生。银行可以通过缩短资产久期来遏制挤兑,但若利率下降,此举将带来资不抵债的风险。要同时避免挤兑与资不抵债,需要以资本覆盖未保险存款特许权的潜在损失。我们估算了存款特许权价值,并利用这些估值识别出2023年区域性银行危机中的脆弱银行。

Abstract

ABSTRACT The deposit franchise is valuable because banks pay below‐market deposit rates. However, if depositors leave, its value vanishes. This can trigger runs by uninsured depositors, even if banks hold fully liquid assets. Because the franchise value increases with interest rates, runs are more harmful, and hence likelier, when rates are high. Banks can deter runs by shortening asset duration, but this risks insolvency if rates fall. Avoiding both runs and insolvency requires capital covering the potential loss of the uninsured deposit franchise. We estimate deposit franchise values and use them to identify vulnerable banks during the 2023 regional bank crisis.
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