Games and Economic Behavior · 2026 · César Martinelli、Naila C. Sebastián Esandi
中文摘要
我们提出一个选举问责模型,并在实验室环境中对其加以检验。正如模型所预测,道德激励与连任意愿相互作用,能够阻止政治家在职业生涯早期收受贿赂。连任激励较弱的处理组在促使政治家表现出良好的初期行为方面效果较差,但在促进后期良好行为方面更为有效。选民犯错的概率以及政治家在最后一期做出良好行为的内在动机在各处理组之间存在差异,机会主义行为在选举激励更强的环境中更为普遍。
Abstract
We propose a model of electoral accountability, and we test it in a lab setting. As predicted by the model, moral incentives and the desire for reelection interact to deter politicians from accepting bribes early in their careers. Treatments with weaker reelection incentives perform worse in encouraging good initial behavior among politicians, but are more effective in promoting good behavior later on. The probability of voter errors and politicians' intrinsic motivation for good behavior in the final period vary across treatments, with opportunistic behavior being more prevalent in environments with stronger electoral incentives.