Games and Economic Behavior · 2026 · Charles A. Holt、Angela M. Smith
中文摘要
本文利用实验室实验,考察了标准图洛克 (Tullock) 寻租模型中群体规模与努力成本对租值消散的影响。数据支持比较静态的纳什均衡定性预测:群体规模与努力成本的降低均会提高努力水平。然而,在所有处理组中,努力水平与消散率均高于纳什预测。此外,虽然将单位努力成本减半会提高个体努力水平,但努力水平并未如预测般完全翻倍,因而租值消散有所降低,由此产生了一个与政策相关的"精简效应"。量化反应均衡 (quantal response equilibrium) 在博弈结构中加入随机元素,能够预测所观察到的高努力水平与高消散,但被证明无法解释精简效应。一种在量化反应中纳入执行误差噪声与损失厌恶的修正模型,其表现优于其他估计模型,并能更贴近地拟合所观察到的全部数据模式,包括精简效应。
Abstract
The effect of group size and effort cost on rent dissipation in the standard Tullock rent seeking model is examined using a laboratory experiment. Data support qualitative comparative static Nash equilibrium predictions as reductions in both group size and effort cost increase effort levels. However, effort and dissipation rates are above Nash predictions for all treatments. In addition, while cutting per-unit effort costs in half increases individual effort levels, they do not fully double as predicted and therefore lower rent dissipation, creating a policy-relevant “streamlining effect”. A quantal response equilibrium, which adds stochastic elements into the game structure, predicts the observed higher effort levels and dissipation but is proven to be unable to explain the streamlining effect. A modification of quantal response that incorporates implementation error noise and loss aversion outperforms other estimated models and tracks the observed all data patterns more closely, including the streamlining effect.