Quantal response equilibrium with a continuum of types: Characterization and nonparametric identification
中文摘要
随机反应均衡 (QRE) 作为纳什均衡的一种统计推广, 是实验数据分析中的标准基准。尽管影响深远, 但在有限博弈之外的情形下, QRE 的非参数刻画与检验尚不存在。我们通过完整刻画一类具有连续类型的二元行动博弈中 QRE 的集合来填补这一空白。我们的刻画在全局博弈、志愿者困境与妥协博弈等情境中给出了精确的预测。此外, 我们利用这些结果构建了 QRE 的非参数检验。作为实证应用, 我们重新分析了 Carrillo 和 Palfrey (2009) 关于妥协博弈的实验数据。
Abstract
Quantal response equilibrium (QRE), a statistical generalization of Nash equilibrium, is a standard benchmark in the analysis of experimental data. Despite its influence, nonparametric characterizations and tests of QRE are unavailable beyond the case of finite games. We address this gap by completely characterizing the set of QRE in a class of binary-action games with a continuum of types. Our characterization provides sharp predictions in settings such as global games, volunteer's dilemma, and the compromise game. Further, we leverage our results to develop nonparametric tests of QRE. As an empirical application, we revisit the experimental data from Carrillo and Palfrey (2009) on the compromise game.