市场化公共项目中的公共与私人信息提供：来自医疗保险市场广告的证据
Public and Private Provision of Information in Market-Based Public Programs: Evidence from Advertising in Health Insurance Marketplaces
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2025 · [{"name": "Naoki Aizawa", "affiliation": ["University of Wisconsin–Madison"]}, {"name": "You Suk Kim", "affiliation": ["Federal Reserve", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors"]}]
中文摘要
本文研究市场型公共项目中的政府广告与私人广告。在一个广告模型中，我们首先考察政府广告在何种情况下能够提高福利。随后，我们估计广告对消费者需求的影响，并在《平价医疗法案》健康保险市场中评估其福利效应。我们发现，政府广告提高了总体参保人数并增进了福利。相比之下，私人广告的市场扩张效应至多是温和的。尽管在某些设定中私人广告增加了消费者对保险公司的需求，但由于寻租竞争，它并不是诱导消费者选择拥有更好保险计划的保险公司的高效工具。（JEL G22, G52, H51, I13, M37）
Abstract
This paper studies government and private advertising in market-based public programs. In a model of advertising, we first examine when government advertising increases welfare. Then, we estimate the effects of advertising on consumer demand and assess their welfare effects in the Affordable Care Act health insurance marketplaces. We find government advertising increases overall enrollment and enhances welfare. By contrast, the market expansion effect of private advertising is modest at most. Although private advertising increases demand for insurers in certain specifications, it is not a very efficient tool to induce consumers to select insurers with better plans due to rent-seeking competition. (JEL G22, G52, H51, I13, M37)