Do Consumers Distinguish Fixed Cost from Variable Cost? “Schmeduling” in Two-Part Tariffs in Energy
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2025 · [{"name": "Koichiro Ito", "affiliation": ["University of Chicago"]}, {"name": "Shuang Zhang", "affiliation": ["Imperial College London"]}]
中文摘要
经济学中的一个核心假设是，消费者能够正确区分固定成本与可变成本。这一假设是最优税收、再分配和价格歧视等多种经济理论的基础。利用中国供暖价格改革中的一项准实验，我们发现了与这一传统假设不一致、而与Liebman和Zeckhauser（2004）提出的"schmeduling"模型更为一致的经验证据。正如我们在论证其对两部制能源价格的政策含义时所表明的，这种schmeduling行为使固定成本直接关系到商品的感知相对价格，从而改变了价格、税收和补贴设计的福利含义。（JEL D12, D91, H24, L94, O12, P28, P36）
Abstract
A central assumption in economics is that consumers properly distinguish fixed cost from variable cost. This assumption is fundamental to various economic theories, including optimal taxation, redistribution, and price discrimination. Using a quasi-experiment in heating price reform in China, we find empirical evidence that is inconsistent with this conventional assumption and more consistent with the “schmeduling” model in Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004). As we demonstrate its policy implications for two-part energy tariffs, this schmeduling behavior makes fixed costs directly relevant to the perceived relative prices of goods, and therefore alters the welfare implications of price, tax, and subsidy designs. (JEL D12, D91, H24, L94, O12, P28, P36)