中文摘要
在一对一匹配市场的背景下，我们研究短视-远见稳定集：当短视代理人只考虑其偏离带来的即期收益，而远见代理人预期反偏离并考虑最终收益时，该稳定集具有内部稳定性和外部稳定性。我们以构造性方式证明了（理性预期）短视-远见稳定集的存在性；在该稳定集中，远见代理人获得单一收益，而短视代理人可能获得多重收益。我们的存在性结果可推广至存在任意规模执行联盟的情形，从而得到联盟短视-远见稳定集；也可推广至执行联盟中并非所有成员都必须严格获益的情形，从而得到短视-远见弱稳定集。当所有远见代理人都具有单位需求时，我们的结果还可推广至多对一匹配市场。作为一个关键推论，我们为效率调整后的延迟接受算法提供了基础：当一方为远见型、另一方为短视型时，该算法的结果构成一个单点短视-远见稳定集。
Abstract
In the context of one-to-one matching markets, we study myopic-farsighted stable sets, which are internally and externally stable when myopic agents consider immediate payoffs from their deviations, while farsighted agents anticipate counter-deviations and consider final payoffs. We constructively prove the existence of a (rational expectations) myopic-farsighted stable set, in which farsighted agents receive a single payoff while myopic agents may receive multiple payoffs. Our existence result extends to settings with enforcing coalitions of arbitrary size, yielding coalitional myopic-farsighted stable sets, and to settings where not all members of an enforcing coalition must strictly gain, yielding myopic-farsighted weakly stable sets. When all farsighted agents have unit demand, our results also extend to many-to-one matching markets. As a key corollary, we provide a foundation for the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm by showing that its outcome constitutes a singleton myopic-farsighted stable set when one side is farsighted and the other is myopic.