Econometrica · 2017 · Ohad Kadan、Philip J. Reny、Jeroen M. Swinkels
中文摘要
我们给出了一般性条件,使得含单个或多个代理人的委托-代理问题在这些条件下存在对委托人最优的机制。我们的结果将纯道德风险与纯逆向选择作为特例加以涵盖。我们允许多维的类型、行动与信号,并同时考虑货币性与非货币性报酬。我们的结果可扩展至机制受到事前或事中约束的情形,并允许委托人在选择代理人合同之外还拥有其他决策。除可测性要求外,我们不对机制空间施加任何先验限制。随机化对于实现最优性而言是必要的情形并不罕见,因此它(理应且)确实被允许使用。随机化在我们的证明中也发挥着关键作用。我们还给出了某些形式的随机化并非必要的条件。
Abstract
We provide general conditions under which principal-agent problems with either one or multiple agents admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal. Our results cover as special cases pure moral hazard and pure adverse selection. We allow multidimensional types, actions, and signals, as well as both financial and non-financial rewards. Our results extend to situations in which there are ex ante or interim restrictions on the mechanism, and allow the principal to have decisions in addition to choosing the agent's contract. Beyond measurability, we require no a priori restrictions on the space of mechanisms. It is not unusual for randomization to be necessary for optimality and so it (should be and) is permitted. Randomization also plays an essential role in our proof. We also provide conditions under which some forms of randomization are unnecessary.