中文摘要
国际反腐败监督能否刺激私人投资？我们考察《联合国反腐败公约》（UNCAC）下对各司法辖区的交错（分批）审议，使用 2003—2023 年 84 个经济体的企业—年度观测值。我们发现，审议之后经济体层面的腐败控制指标出现改善。局部投影双重差分估计表明，审议使企业资本支出相对于资产提高 1.2126 个百分点，相当于样本均值的 20%。动态估计显示审议前不存在系统性调整，且该结果在剔除有影响力的经济体、经济体层面重新加权、替代样本限制、滞后结果变量控制以及替代的交错处理估计量下均稳健。在高腐败经济体和发展中经济体，以及在融资约束更强、更依赖政府、国内集中度更高或更依赖不可逆资本的企业中，投资反应更强。这些模式与国际监督降低与腐败相关的制度风险、融资摩擦以及推迟投资的价值相一致。UNCAC 审议之后就业、研发投资和杠杆率也出现上升。进一步分析未提供证据表明投资增加伴随投资效率的系统性下降。总体而言，研究结果表明，非惩罚性的国际同行审议机制能够影响企业的实际活动，在初始制度摩擦更大的地方尤为如此。
Abstract
Can international anti-corruption monitoring stimulate private investment? We examine staggered reviews across jurisdictions under the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), using firm-year observations from 84 economies over 2003–2023. We document that reviews are followed by improvements in economy-level corruption-control indicators. Local-projections difference-in-differences estimates indicate that reviews raise firms' capital expenditure relative to assets by 1.2126 percentage points, equivalent to 20% of the sample mean. Dynamic estimates show no systematic pre-review adjustment, and the result is robust to influential-economy exclusions, economy-level reweighting, alternative sample restrictions, lagged-outcome controls, and alternative staggered-adoption estimators. Investment responses are stronger in high-corruption economies and developing economies and among firms that are more financially constrained, government dependent, domestically concentrated, or reliant on irreversible capital. These patterns are consistent with international oversight reducing corruption-related institutional risk, financing frictions, and the value of delaying investment. UNCAC reviews are also followed by increases in employment, R&D investment, and leverage. Additional analyses provide no evidence that the increase in investment is accompanied by a systematic decline in investment efficiency. Overall, the findings show that a non-punitive international peer-review mechanism can affect firms’ real activity, particularly where initial institutional frictions are greater.