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(隐性的)撒玛利亚人竞争

The (hidden) Samaritan contest
Journal of Development Economics · 2027 · Rabah Arezki、Youssouf Camara、Frederick van der Ploeg、Grégoire Rota‐Graziosi

中文摘要

本文探讨对外援助是否由捐助方之间为获取自然资源而展开的(隐性)竞争所驱动,利用基于大型国家面板数据的引力模型,借助重大矿产发现的时点与规模进行识别。结果显示,在其他条件相同的情况下,经历重大矿产发现的受援国获得的双边援助更多而非更少。我们的主要结果间接源于中国于2001年加入世界贸易组织,这加剧了全球对获取自然资源的竞争。我们得出结论:能源转型及其对矿产的需求将进一步加剧援助捐助方之间的(隐性)竞争。

Abstract

This paper explores whether foreign aid is driven by a (hidden) contest amongst donors to access natural resources, exploiting the timing and size of major mineral discoveries using a gravity model for a large panel of countries. Results show that recipient countries that experience major discoveries receive more, not less, bilateral aid, all else equal. Our main result is driven indirectly by China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, which intensified global competition for access to natural resources. We conclude that the energy transition and its requirement in minerals will further exacerbate the (hidden) contest amongst aid donors.
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