Journal of Development Economics · 2027 · Prabhat Barnwal、Ritam Chaurey、Reajul Chowdhury、S.K. Ritadhi
中文摘要
本文研究银行网点在全国范围的扩张如何影响非正规微型企业的经营绩效。我们利用印度的分支机构授权政策(Branch Authorization Policy, BAP),该政策要求银行在“银行服务不足”的地区开设网点。通过断点回归设计,我们发现银行服务不足地区的微型企业报告更高的增加值、营业收入和生产性资产,但本地注册并未增加。然而,企业资产负债表上的借款并未增加。家庭资产负债表提供了一个能调和上述发现的第二视角:银行服务不足地区的家庭增加了用于非农经营的银行借款,其规模与微型企业生产性资产的增加相当。微型企业主因此是以家庭而非企业的身份获得银行信贷,这削弱了正规化的一个关键激励,并有助于解释为何金融可得性的扩大能与持续存在的非正规性并存。
Abstract
Our paper studies how the nationwide expansion of bank branches affects the performance of informal microenterprises. We exploit the Branch Authorization Policy (BAP) in India, which directed banks to open branches in “underbanked” districts. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that microenterprises in underbanked districts report higher value-addition, revenues, and productive assets, but no increase in local registration. However, borrowings on the enterprise balance sheet do not increase. The household balance sheet offers a second perspective that reconciles these findings: households in underbanked districts increased their bank borrowings for non-farm business by an amount comparable to the increase in microenterprise productive assets. Micro-entrepreneurs thus accessed bank credit as households rather than as enterprises, weakening a key incentive to formalize and helping explain how expanded access to finance can coexist with persistent informality.