The Political Economy of Regional Development: Evidence from the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno
中文摘要
公共投资权限的下放可能导致代理问题,并引发不同层级政府之间的策略性再分配。我们在Cassa per il Mezzogiorno(意大利南方开发基金)的背景下检验这一假说:这是一项针对意大利南部的大规模发展计划(1950—1984年)。到1971年,资金分配的权限从中央集中式委员会转移至新成立的大区政府。我们将关于地方行政官员的独特历史数据与项目的详细信息相结合,发现权限下放后,与大区政府政治立场一致的市镇被分派到数量更多的项目,但对长期经济结果未产生任何积极影响。
Abstract
Devolution of authority over public investments can lead to agency problems and trigger tactical redistribution between different tiers of government. We test this hypothesis in the context of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno: a massive development programme for Southern Italy (1950-1984). By 1971, the authority over funds allocation was transferred from a centralised committee to the newborn regional governments. We combine unique historical data on local administrators with detailed information on projects, and find that, after devolution, municipalities aligned with the regional government were assigned a higher number of projects, without producing any positive impact on long-run economic outcomes.