起诉利维坦：跨区域管辖权改革对企业投资的影响

中文摘要

本文研究跨区域管辖权改革（TRJ）如何影响企业投资。该改革将行政诉讼移至被告政府所在辖区之外的法院审理，从而限制了地方政府对法院的影响力。我们利用该改革在各城市交错推行的特点，采用堆叠双重差分设计。我们发现，该改革使企业投资提高约相当于样本均值28.7%的幅度。补充证据表明，该改革改善了企业在法院的判决结果，在改革前对地方制度信任较高的地区效应更强，并与更低的制度性交易成本和融资约束相关联。对于投资不可逆性更强、国有持股比例更低、融资渠道更好的企业，该效应更大。该改革还促使企业获取更多土地并承担更多风险，尽管部分新增投资表现为过度投资。这些结果表明，在法律制度薄弱的环境中，一项有针对性的司法改革能够改变企业行为。

Abstract

We study how the Trans-Regional Jurisdiction reform (TRJ) affects corporate investment. The reform moves administrative lawsuits to courts outside the defendant government's home jurisdiction, which limits local government influence over the courts. We use a stacked difference-in-differences design that draws on the staggered rollout of the reform across cities. We find that the reform raises corporate investment by about 28.7 percent of the sample mean. Complementary evidence shows that the reform improves court outcomes for firms, has stronger effects where pre-reform trust in local institutions is higher, and is associated with lower institutional transaction costs and financing constraints. The effect is larger for firms with more irreversible investment, lower state ownership, and better access to finance. The reform also leads firms to acquire more land and take on more risk, although part of the higher investment appears as overinvestment. These results show how a focused judicial reform can change firm behavior where legal institutions are weak.