Expected foreign military intervention and demand for state-building: Evidence from Mali
Journal of Development Economics · 2027 · Alessandro Belmonte、Désirée Teobaldelli、Davide Ticchi
中文摘要
我们研究外国军事干预对公民参与国家建设进程动机的信息效应。我们分析2012年联合国安全理事会授权干预马里的决议，该决议旨在机构深刻危机期间统一国家并恢复民主。通过利用外国干预宣布时点相对于Afrobarometer访谈时间线的随机性，我们记录到，与在宣布前数日接受访谈的个体相比，在宣布后数日接受访谈的个体在相同特征、地区和族群条件下，具有更高的内在纳税遵从动机，更不倾向于拒绝报税，并且即使有机会也更不愿逃税。我们证明，这些效应特定于国家能力较低和族群多样性有限的地区，以及特定于认为其族群未受到国家系统性歧视的个体。与我们的论述一致，我们记录到，纳税遵从动机仅在能够在家中获取新闻（拥有电视或收音机）的受访者中上升。我们的结果通过了广泛的证伪检验，并表明外国军事干预发出国家建设信号，提高了参与国家建设的预期收益。
Abstract
We study the informational effects of foreign military intervention on citizens’ motivations to participate in state-building processes. We analyze the 2012 United Nations Security Council resolution that authorized intervention in Mali to reunify the country and restore democracy during a profound institutional crisis. By exploiting the randomness of the foreign intervention announcement, relative to the timeline of the Afrobarometer interviews, we document that individuals interviewed the days after the announcement have a higher intrinsic motivation to comply with taxes, are less inclined to refuse to filing taxes, and are more reluctant to evade even if had chances, relative to individuals, interviewed immediately before, with the same characteristics, region, and ethnic group. We demonstrate that these effects are specific to regions characterized by low state capacity and limited ethnic diversity, as well as to individuals who perceive that their ethnic group has not been systematically discriminated against by the state. Consistently with our story, we document that motivations to comply only increase in respondents with access to the news at home (who own either a TV or a radio). Our results survive a wide range of falsification tests and indicate that foreign military interventions signal state-building, raising the expected benefits to participate.