工业用地定价中的逐底竞争动态：中国 2009 年最低价调整政策的非对称效应

中文摘要

最低价格下限是发展中经济体监管工业用地市场的一种常见但研究不足的工具。我们利用中国 2009 年对工业用地最低价的调整，该调整降低了部分县的最低土地价格，同时提高了其他县的最低土地价格。将地块层面土地交易与县级特征结合，采用双重差分设计，我们发现显著的非对称性：放松最低价的县工业用地价格下降 9.15%，出让面积扩张 23.12%，而收紧最低价的县则未表现出可检测的变化。这种非对称性反映了价格下限最初的约束状态：在放松最低价的县，下限具有约束力，对可流动制造业资本的竞争压低了价格并扩大了土地供给；而在收紧最低价的县，下限不具约束力，提高后的下限或仍低于市场价格，或通过返还和补贴被抵消。放松最低价的县还相对于样本均值多获得 15.53% 的大型工业企业，财政收入增加 7.90%，但新增土地出让集中于低技术和中低技术、土地密集型部门，这一模式持续至 2022 年，并未转向高技术产业。因此，放松具有约束力的工业用地价格下限带来企业进入和财政收入的短期收益，却使这些县仍专业化于低技术产业，这与通过工业用地定价运作的逐底竞争相一致。

Abstract

Minimum price floors are a common but understudied instrument for regulating industrial land markets in developing economies. We exploit China’s 2009 adjustment of minimum industrial land prices, which lowered the minimum land price in some counties and raised it in others. Combining parcel-level land transactions with county characteristics in a difference-in-differences design, we find a striking asymmetry: easing counties experienced a 9.15% decline in industrial land prices and a 23.12% expansion in transferred area, whereas tightening counties showed no detectable change. The asymmetry reflects the floor’s initial binding status: it was binding in easing counties, where competition for mobile manufacturing capital pushed prices down and expanded land supply, but non-binding in tightening counties, where the raised floor either stayed below market prices or was offset through rebates and subsidies. Easing counties also gained 15.53% more large-scale industrial enterprises relative to the sample mean and 7.90% in fiscal revenue, yet new land sales concentrated in low- and medium-low-tech, land-intensive sectors, a pattern that persisted through 2022 with no shift toward higher-tech industries. Relaxing a binding industrial land price floor thus brings short-run gains in firm entry and fiscal revenue but leaves these counties specialized in low-tech industries, consistent with race-to-the-bottom competition operating through industrial land pricing.