信息系统、服务提供与腐败：来自孟加拉国公务员系统的证据
Information Systems, Service Delivery, and Corruption: Evidence From the Bangladesh Civil Service
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2025 · [{"name": "Martin Mattsson", "affiliation": ["National University of Singapore"]}]
中文摘要
公共服务交付缓慢与腐败是中低收入国家的常见问题。更完善的管理信息系统能否提高交付速度？提高交付速度能否减少腐败？在与孟加拉国公务员系统合作开展的一项大规模实验中，我每月向政府官员及其上级发送评分卡，衡量其服务交付延误情况。评分卡使按时服务交付比例提高了11%，但并未减少贿赂；相反，评分卡增加了高绩效官僚的贿赂。一个以官僚声誉关切约束贿赂行为的模型可以解释这一结果：当积极的绩效反馈提升官僚声誉时，该约束被放松，贿赂随之增加。（JEL D73, D83, H83, O17）
Abstract
Slow public service delivery and corruption are common problems in low- and middle-income countries. Can better management information systems improve delivery speed? Does improving the delivery speed reduce corruption? In a large-scale experiment with the Bangladesh Civil Service, I send monthly scorecards measuring delays in service delivery to government officials and their supervisors. The scorecards increase on-time service delivery by 11 percent but do not reduce bribes. Instead, the scorecards increase bribes for high-performing bureaucrats. A model where bureaucrats' reputational concerns constrain bribes can explain the results. When positive performance feedback improves bureaucrats' reputations, the constraint is relaxed, and bribes increase. (JEL D73, D83, H83, O17)