偏好、选择与教师薪酬结构
Preferences, Selection, and the Structure of Teacher Pay
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2025 · [{"name": "Andrew C. Johnston", "affiliation": ["University of California, Merced"]}]
中文摘要
本文利用一项与教师效能数据相关联的离散选择实验，考察教师偏好。我估计了教师对一组丰富的薪酬要素和工作条件的支付意愿。高效能教师通常与同行拥有相同的偏好，但他们对绩效薪酬的偏好更强。我利用这些偏好估计值，考察实现三个关键目标下的最优薪酬结构：最大化教师效用、最大化教师留任率，以及最大化学生成绩。在每个目标下，学校都对工资和绩效薪酬使用不足，而对退休福利使用过度。重构薪酬结构可显著改善教师福利与学生成绩。(JEL H75, I21, J31, J32, J45, J81)
Abstract
I examine teacher preferences using a discrete-choice experiment linked to data on teacher effectiveness. I estimate willingness to pay for a rich set of compensation elements and working conditions. Highly effective teachers usually have the same preferences as their peers, but they have stronger preferences for performance pay. I use the preference estimates to investigate the optimal compensation structure for three key objectives: maximizing teacher utility, maximizing teacher retention, and maximizing student achievement. Under each objective, schools underutilize salary and performance pay while overutilizing retirement benefits. Restructuring compensation can significantly improve both teacher welfare and student achievement. (JEL H75, I21, J31, J32, J45, J81)