新的零工工作还是报告方式的变化？理解税收数据中的自雇趋势
New Gig Work or Changes in Reporting? Understanding Self-Employment Trends in Tax Data
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2025 · [{"name": "Andrew Garin", "affiliation": ["Carnegie Mellon University"]}, {"name": "Emilie Jackson", "affiliation": ["Michigan State University"]}, {"name": "Dmitri Koustas", "affiliation": ["University of Chicago"]}]
中文摘要
我们发现，向美国国税局（IRS）申报自雇的劳动者占比上升，与2005年后企业申报支付给"零工"及其他合同工人的报酬变化无关，而主要由处于劳动所得税抵免（EITC）递增区间内的个人自报收入所驱动。我们采用一种断点回归（RD）设计，该设计在劳动供给决策已成为沉没成本之后于年末产生税率的外生变化，并发现：在实际劳动供给既定的条件下，税法激励会提高自雇申报。我们表明，随着税法知识的传播，这一申报效应随时间推移而增强。（JEL C83, H24, H31, J22, J23）
Abstract
We show that increases in the share of workers reporting self-employment to the IRS are not associated with changes in firm-reported payments to “gig” and other contract workers after 2005 but are driven primarily by self-reported earnings of individuals in the EITC phase-in range. We examine a regression discontinuity design that generates exogenous variation in tax rates at the end of the year after labor supply decisions are already sunk and find tax code incentives increase self-employment reporting conditional on actual labor supply. We show that reporting effects have grown over time as knowledge of the tax code spreads. (JEL C83, H24, H31, J22, J23)